Financial Crisis Inquiry Report chapters
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Recording joanne-turner · Narrated by Joanne Turner, Cbteddy, mpinedag
Showing 83 of 183 chapters
| Chapter | Title | Start | Duration |
|---|---|---|---|
| 101 | Ch 16 Derivatives: "Early stages of assessing the potential systemic risk" | 20:40:18 | 0:07:12 |
| 102 | Ch 16 Banks: "The markets were really, really dicey" | 20:47:30 | 0:26:35 |
| 103 | Commission Conclusions on Chapter 16 | 21:14:05 | 0:01:19 |
| 104 | Chapter 17 September 2008: The takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Intro) | 21:15:24 | 0:03:28 |
| 105 | Ch 17 "A good time to buy" | 21:18:52 | 0:05:04 |
| 106 | Ch 17 "The only game in town" | 21:23:56 | 0:03:30 |
| 107 | Ch 17 "It's a time game...be cool" | 21:27:26 | 0:06:38 |
| 108 | Ch 17 "The idea strikes me as perverse" | 21:34:04 | 0:03:58 |
| 109 | Ch 17 "It will increase confidence" | 21:38:02 | 0:08:45 |
| 110 | Ch 17 "Critical unsafe and unsound practices" | 21:46:47 | 0:06:22 |
| 111 | Ch 17 "They went from zero to three with no warning in between" | 21:53:09 | 0:07:31 |
| 112 | Ch 17 "The worst-run financial institution" | 22:00:40 | 0:03:37 |
| 113 | Ch 17 "Wasn't done at my pay grade" | 22:04:17 | 0:01:16 |
| 114 | Commission Conclusions on Chapter 17 | 22:05:33 | 0:02:26 |
| 115 | Chapter 18 September 2008: The bankruptcy of Lehman (Intro) | 22:07:59 | 0:04:37 |
| 116 | Ch 18 "Get more conservatively funded" | 22:12:36 | 0:07:17 |
| 117 | Ch 18 "This is not sounding good at all" | 22:19:53 | 0:03:38 |
| 118 | Ch 18 "Spook the market" | 22:23:31 | 0:11:07 |
| 119 | Ch 18 "Imagination hat" | 22:34:38 | 0:08:19 |
| 120 | Ch 18 "Heads of family" | 22:42:57 | 0:03:38 |
| 121 | Ch 18 "Tell those sons of bitches to unwind" | 22:46:35 | 0:03:20 |
| 122 | Ch 18 "This doesn't seem like it is going to end pretty" | 22:49:55 | 0:08:02 |
| 123 | Ch 18 "The only alternative was that Lehman had to fail" | 22:57:57 | 0:03:48 |
| 124 | Ch 18 "A calamity" | 23:01:45 | 0:12:42 |
| 125 | Commission Conclusions on Chapter 18 | 23:14:27 | 0:02:30 |
| 126 | Chapter 19 September 2008: The bailout of AIG (Intro) | 23:16:57 | 0:05:14 |
| 127 | Ch 19 "Current liquidity position is precarious" | 23:22:11 | 0:06:56 |
| 128 | Ch 19 "Spillover effect" | 23:29:07 | 0:10:50 |
| 129 | Ch 19 "Like a gnat on an elephant" | 23:39:57 | 0:05:18 |
| 130 | Commission Conclusions on Chapter 19 | 23:45:15 | 0:03:07 |
| 131 | Chapter 20 Crisis and Panic (Intro) | 23:48:22 | 0:07:45 |
| 132 | Ch 20 Money market funds: "Dealers weren't even picking up their phones" | 23:56:07 | 0:10:36 |
| 133 | Ch 20 Morgan Stanley: "Now we're the next in line" | 24:06:43 | 0:13:07 |
| 134 | Ch 20 Over-the-counter derivatives "A grinding halt" | 24:19:50 | 0:06:26 |
| 135 | Ch 20 Washington Mutual "It's yours" | 24:26:16 | 0:04:16 |
| 136 | Ch 20 Wachovia "At the front end of teh dominoes as other dominoes fell" | 24:30:32 | 0:18:26 |
| 137 | Ch 20 TARP "Comprehensive approach" | 24:48:58 | 0:18:03 |
| 138 | Ch 20 AIG "We needed to stop the sucking chest wound in this patient" | 25:07:01 | 0:10:19 |
| 139 | Ch 20 Citigroup "Let the world know we will not pull a Lehman" | 25:17:20 | 0:11:15 |
| 140 | Ch 20 Bank of America "A shotgun wedding" | 25:28:35 | 0:13:17 |
| 141 | Commission Conclusions on Chapter 20 | 25:41:52 | 0:02:45 |
| 142 | Chapter 21 The Economic Fallout (Intro) | 25:44:37 | 0:04:17 |
| 143 | Ch 21 Households "I'm not eating, I'm not sleeping" | 25:48:54 | 0:12:15 |
| 144 | Ch 21 Businesses "Squirrels storing nuts" | 26:01:09 | 0:09:54 |
| 145 | Ch 21 Commercial real estate: "Nothing's moving" | 26:11:03 | 0:05:09 |
| 146 | Ch 21 Government: "State struggled to close shortfalls" | 26:16:12 | 0:08:06 |
| 147 | Ch 21 The financial sector: "Almost triple the level of three years earlier" | 26:24:18 | 0:03:18 |
| 148 | Ch 22 Foreclosures on the rise: "Hard to talk about any recovery" | 26:27:36 | 0:06:39 |
| 149 | Ch 22 Initiatives to stem foreclosures "Persistently disregard" | 26:34:15 | 0:06:37 |
| 150 | Ch 22 Flaws in the process: "Speculation and worst-case scenarios" | 26:40:52 | 0:05:39 |
| 151 | Ch 22 Neighborhood effects: "I'm not leaving" | 26:46:31 | 0:05:26 |
| 152 | Commission Conclusions on Chapter 22 | 26:51:57 | 0:01:01 |
| 153 | Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Intro | 26:52:58 | 0:01:19 |
| 154 | Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - How our approach differs from others? | 26:54:17 | 0:07:09 |
| 155 | Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Stages of the crisis | 27:01:26 | 0:02:26 |
| 156 | Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The ten essential causes of the financial and economic crisis | 27:03:52 | 0:06:10 |
| 157 | Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The credit bubble: global capita flows, underpriced risk, and Federal Reserve policy | 27:10:02 | 0:08:30 |
| 158 | Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The housing bubble | 27:18:32 | 0:08:35 |
| 159 | Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Turning bad mortgages into toxic financial assets | 27:27:07 | 0:07:28 |
| 160 | Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Big bank bets and why banks failed | 27:34:35 | 0:09:32 |
| 161 | Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Two types of systemic failure | 27:44:07 | 0:13:52 |
| 162 | Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The shock and panic | 27:57:59 | 0:06:39 |
| 163 | Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The system freezing | 28:04:38 | 0:03:50 |
| 164 | Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Intro | 28:08:28 | 0:23:30 |
| 165 | Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Summary | 28:31:58 | 0:07:41 |
| 166 | Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 1. Government policies resulted in an unprecedented number of risky mortgages | 28:39:39 | 0:15:59 |
| 167 | Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 2. The great housing bubble and its effects | 28:55:38 | 0:13:03 |
| 168 | Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 3. Delinquency rates on nontraditional mortgages | 29:08:41 | 0:04:20 |
| 169 | Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 4. The origin and growth of subprime PMBS | 29:13:01 | 0:07:58 |
| 170 | Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 5. What was known about NTMs prior to the crisis? | 29:20:59 | 0:17:17 |
| 171 | Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 6. Conclusion | 29:38:16 | 0:04:40 |
| 172 | Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - Intro | 29:42:56 | 0:03:26 |
| 173 | Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - How failures among NTMs were transmitted to the financial system | 29:46:22 | 0:03:21 |
| 174 | Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - The defaults begin | 29:49:43 | 0:34:12 |
| 175 | Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - Intro | 30:23:55 | 0:09:00 |
| 176 | Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 1. HUD's central role | 30:32:55 | 0:07:34 |
| 177 | Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 2. The decline of mortgage underwriting standards | 30:40:29 | 0:35:58 |
| 178 | Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSEs' acquired so many NTMs, part 1 | 31:16:27 | 0:27:41 |
| 179 | Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSEs' acquired so many NTMs, part 2 | 31:44:08 | 0:28:32 |
| 180 | Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 4. Competition between the GSEs and FHA for subprime and alt-a mortgages | 32:12:40 | 0:10:15 |
| 181 | Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 5. Enlisting mortgage bankers and subprime lenders in affordable housing | 32:22:55 | 0:05:10 |
| 182 | Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 6. The community reinvestment act | 32:28:05 | 0:22:13 |
| 183 | Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - IV. Conclusion | 32:50:18 | 0:02:37 |