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Financial Crisis Inquiry Report chapters

About this audiobook · Recording details

Recording joanne-turner · Narrated by Joanne Turner, Cbteddy, mpinedag

Showing 83 of 183 chapters

Chapter titles and times
ChapterTitleStartDuration
101Ch 16 Derivatives: "Early stages of assessing the potential systemic risk"20:40:180:07:12
102Ch 16 Banks: "The markets were really, really dicey"20:47:300:26:35
103Commission Conclusions on Chapter 1621:14:050:01:19
104Chapter 17 September 2008: The takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Intro)21:15:240:03:28
105Ch 17 "A good time to buy"21:18:520:05:04
106Ch 17 "The only game in town"21:23:560:03:30
107Ch 17 "It's a time game...be cool"21:27:260:06:38
108Ch 17 "The idea strikes me as perverse"21:34:040:03:58
109Ch 17 "It will increase confidence"21:38:020:08:45
110Ch 17 "Critical unsafe and unsound practices"21:46:470:06:22
111Ch 17 "They went from zero to three with no warning in between"21:53:090:07:31
112Ch 17 "The worst-run financial institution"22:00:400:03:37
113Ch 17 "Wasn't done at my pay grade"22:04:170:01:16
114Commission Conclusions on Chapter 1722:05:330:02:26
115Chapter 18 September 2008: The bankruptcy of Lehman (Intro)22:07:590:04:37
116Ch 18 "Get more conservatively funded"22:12:360:07:17
117Ch 18 "This is not sounding good at all"22:19:530:03:38
118Ch 18 "Spook the market"22:23:310:11:07
119Ch 18 "Imagination hat"22:34:380:08:19
120Ch 18 "Heads of family"22:42:570:03:38
121Ch 18 "Tell those sons of bitches to unwind"22:46:350:03:20
122Ch 18 "This doesn't seem like it is going to end pretty"22:49:550:08:02
123Ch 18 "The only alternative was that Lehman had to fail"22:57:570:03:48
124Ch 18 "A calamity"23:01:450:12:42
125Commission Conclusions on Chapter 1823:14:270:02:30
126Chapter 19 September 2008: The bailout of AIG (Intro)23:16:570:05:14
127Ch 19 "Current liquidity position is precarious"23:22:110:06:56
128Ch 19 "Spillover effect"23:29:070:10:50
129Ch 19 "Like a gnat on an elephant"23:39:570:05:18
130Commission Conclusions on Chapter 1923:45:150:03:07
131Chapter 20 Crisis and Panic (Intro)23:48:220:07:45
132Ch 20 Money market funds: "Dealers weren't even picking up their phones"23:56:070:10:36
133Ch 20 Morgan Stanley: "Now we're the next in line"24:06:430:13:07
134Ch 20 Over-the-counter derivatives "A grinding halt"24:19:500:06:26
135Ch 20 Washington Mutual "It's yours"24:26:160:04:16
136Ch 20 Wachovia "At the front end of teh dominoes as other dominoes fell"24:30:320:18:26
137Ch 20 TARP "Comprehensive approach"24:48:580:18:03
138Ch 20 AIG "We needed to stop the sucking chest wound in this patient"25:07:010:10:19
139Ch 20 Citigroup "Let the world know we will not pull a Lehman"25:17:200:11:15
140Ch 20 Bank of America "A shotgun wedding"25:28:350:13:17
141Commission Conclusions on Chapter 2025:41:520:02:45
142Chapter 21 The Economic Fallout (Intro)25:44:370:04:17
143Ch 21 Households "I'm not eating, I'm not sleeping"25:48:540:12:15
144Ch 21 Businesses "Squirrels storing nuts"26:01:090:09:54
145Ch 21 Commercial real estate: "Nothing's moving"26:11:030:05:09
146Ch 21 Government: "State struggled to close shortfalls"26:16:120:08:06
147Ch 21 The financial sector: "Almost triple the level of three years earlier"26:24:180:03:18
148Ch 22 Foreclosures on the rise: "Hard to talk about any recovery"26:27:360:06:39
149Ch 22 Initiatives to stem foreclosures "Persistently disregard"26:34:150:06:37
150Ch 22 Flaws in the process: "Speculation and worst-case scenarios"26:40:520:05:39
151Ch 22 Neighborhood effects: "I'm not leaving"26:46:310:05:26
152Commission Conclusions on Chapter 2226:51:570:01:01
153Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Intro26:52:580:01:19
154Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - How our approach differs from others?26:54:170:07:09
155Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Stages of the crisis27:01:260:02:26
156Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The ten essential causes of the financial and economic crisis27:03:520:06:10
157Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The credit bubble: global capita flows, underpriced risk, and Federal Reserve policy27:10:020:08:30
158Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The housing bubble27:18:320:08:35
159Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Turning bad mortgages into toxic financial assets27:27:070:07:28
160Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Big bank bets and why banks failed27:34:350:09:32
161Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Two types of systemic failure27:44:070:13:52
162Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The shock and panic27:57:590:06:39
163Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The system freezing28:04:380:03:50
164Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Intro28:08:280:23:30
165Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Summary28:31:580:07:41
166Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 1. Government policies resulted in an unprecedented number of risky mortgages28:39:390:15:59
167Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 2. The great housing bubble and its effects28:55:380:13:03
168Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 3. Delinquency rates on nontraditional mortgages29:08:410:04:20
169Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 4. The origin and growth of subprime PMBS29:13:010:07:58
170Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 5. What was known about NTMs prior to the crisis?29:20:590:17:17
171Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 6. Conclusion29:38:160:04:40
172Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - Intro29:42:560:03:26
173Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - How failures among NTMs were transmitted to the financial system29:46:220:03:21
174Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - The defaults begin29:49:430:34:12
175Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - Intro30:23:550:09:00
176Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 1. HUD's central role30:32:550:07:34
177Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 2. The decline of mortgage underwriting standards30:40:290:35:58
178Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSEs' acquired so many NTMs, part 131:16:270:27:41
179Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSEs' acquired so many NTMs, part 231:44:080:28:32
180Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 4. Competition between the GSEs and FHA for subprime and alt-a mortgages32:12:400:10:15
181Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 5. Enlisting mortgage bankers and subprime lenders in affordable housing32:22:550:05:10
182Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 6. The community reinvestment act32:28:050:22:13
183Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - IV. Conclusion32:50:180:02:37