Financial Crisis Inquiry Report chapters
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Recording joanne-turner · Narrated by Joanne Turner, Cbteddy, mpinedag
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| Chapter | Title | Start | Duration |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Preface | 0:00:00 | 0:08:03 |
| 2 | Conclusions of the Commission | 0:08:03 | 0:38:05 |
| 3 | Conclusions of the Commission, concluded | 0:46:08 | 0:22:59 |
| 4 | Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 1 | 1:09:07 | 0:38:26 |
| 5 | Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 2 | 1:47:33 | 0:45:54 |
| 6 | Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 3 | 2:33:27 | 0:17:57 |
| 7 | Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: Commercial Paper and Repos | 2:51:24 | 0:30:09 |
| 8 | Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: The Savings and Loan Crisis | 3:21:33 | 0:18:16 |
| 9 | Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac | 3:39:49 | 0:20:26 |
| 10 | Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Structured Finance | 4:00:15 | 0:12:11 |
| 11 | Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: The Growth of Derivatives | 4:12:26 | 0:25:53 |
| 12 | Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Expansion of Banking Activities | 4:38:19 | 0:19:24 |
| 13 | Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Long-Term Capital Management | 4:57:43 | 0:12:00 |
| 14 | Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Dot-Com Crash | 5:09:43 | 0:12:11 |
| 15 | Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: The Wages of Finance | 5:21:54 | 0:13:26 |
| 16 | Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Financial Sector Growth | 5:35:20 | 0:08:47 |
| 17 | Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Mortgage Securitization | 5:44:07 | 0:17:04 |
| 18 | Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Greater Access to Lending | 6:01:11 | 0:06:19 |
| 19 | Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Subprime Lenders in Turmoil | 6:07:30 | 0:05:33 |
| 20 | Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: The Regulators | 6:13:03 | 0:19:20 |
| 21 | Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Housing, A Powerful Stabilizing Force | 6:32:23 | 0:19:39 |
| 22 | Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Subprime Loans, Buyers Will Pay A Premium | 6:52:02 | 0:18:12 |
| 23 | Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Citigroup: Invited Regulatory Scrutiny | 7:10:14 | 0:04:42 |
| 24 | Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Federal Rules: Intended to Curb Unfair or Abusive Lending | 7:14:56 | 0:12:52 |
| 25 | Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. States: Long-Standing Position | 7:27:48 | 0:04:02 |
| 26 | Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Community-Lending Pledges: What We Do Is Reaffirm Our Intention" | 7:31:50 | 0:10:44 |
| 27 | Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Bank Capital Standards: "Arbitrage" | 7:42:34 | 0:05:45 |
| 28 | Ch. 6. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 6 | 7:48:19 | 0:01:18 |
| 29 | Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. An Irresistible Profit Opportunity | 7:49:37 | 0:10:21 |
| 30 | Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Mortgages: A Good Loan | 7:59:58 | 0:32:56 |
| 31 | Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Federal Regulators: Immunity from Many State Laws is a Significant Benefit | 8:32:54 | 0:06:49 |
| 32 | Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Wall Street Was Very Hungry For Our Product | 8:39:43 | 0:17:23 |
| 33 | Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Moody's: Given A Blank Check | 8:57:06 | 0:16:09 |
| 34 | Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Less Competition in the Marketplace | 9:13:15 | 0:13:09 |
| 35 | Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 7 | 9:26:24 | 0:03:24 |
| 36 | Ch. 8. The CDO Machine | 9:29:48 | 0:07:50 |
| 37 | Ch. 8. We Created the Investor | 9:37:38 | 0:22:21 |
| 38 | Ch. 8. Bear Stearns' Hedge Funds: It Functioned Fine Up Until One Day It Just Didn't Function | 9:59:59 | 0:10:33 |
| 39 | Ch. 8. Citigroup's Liquidity puts: A Potential Conflict of Interest | 10:10:32 | 0:10:51 |
| 40 | Ch. 8. AIG:Golden Goose for the Entire Street | 10:21:23 | 0:10:28 |
| 41 | Ch. 8. Goldman Sachs: Multiplied the Effects of the Collapse in Subprime | 10:31:51 | 0:17:16 |
| 42 | Ch. 8. Moody's: Achieved Through Some Alchemy | 10:49:07 | 0:18:33 |
| 43 | Ch. 8. SEC: It's Going to be an Awfully Big Mess | 11:07:40 | 0:19:27 |
| 44 | Commission Conclusions on Chapter 8 | 11:27:07 | 0:02:55 |
| 45 | Chapter 9. The Bubble, "A Credit-induced Boom" | 11:30:02 | 0:15:00 |
| 46 | Mortgage Fraud: Crime-facilitative environments | 11:45:02 | 0:22:31 |
| 47 | Disclosure and due diligence: A Quality Control Issue in the Factory | 12:07:33 | 0:24:27 |
| 48 | Regulators: markets will always self-correct | 12:32:00 | 0:14:56 |
| 49 | Leveraged Loans and Commercial Real Estate: You've Got to Get Up and Dance | 12:46:56 | 0:11:08 |
| 50 | Lehman: From Moving to Storage | 12:58:04 | 0:07:47 |
| 51 | Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Two Stark Choices | 13:05:51 | 0:11:36 |
| 52 | 2006: Increase Our Penetration into Subprime. 2007: Moving deeper into the credit pool | 13:17:27 | 0:12:30 |
| 53 | Affordable housing goals: "GSEs cried bloody murder forever." The impact of the goals | 13:29:57 | 0:17:05 |
| 54 | Commission Conclusions on Chapter 9 | 13:47:02 | 0:01:39 |
| 55 | Ch. 10. CDO Managers: "We Are Not A Rent-A-Manager" | 13:48:41 | 0:09:52 |
| 56 | Ch. 10. Credit Default Swaps: "Dumb Question" | 13:58:33 | 0:24:17 |
| 57 | Citigroup: "I Do Not Believe We Were Powerless" | 14:22:50 | 0:18:04 |
| 58 | AIG: "I'm Not Getting Paid Enough to Stand on These Tracks" | 14:40:54 | 0:08:42 |
| 59 | Merrill Lynch: "Whatever It Takes" | 14:49:36 | 0:12:28 |
| 60 | Regulators: "Are Undue Concentrations of Risk Developing?" | 15:02:04 | 0:07:29 |
| 61 | Moody's: "It Was All About Revenue" | 15:09:33 | 0:23:34 |
| 62 | Commission Conclusions on Chapter 10 | 15:33:07 | 0:02:20 |
| 63 | Ch. 11. The Bust. Delinquencies: "The Turn of the Housing Market" | 15:35:27 | 0:29:56 |
| 64 | Ch. 11. Rating Downgrades: "Never Before" | 16:05:23 | 0:08:04 |
| 65 | Ch. 11. CDOs: "Climbing the Wall of Subprime Lending" | 16:13:27 | 0:04:50 |
| 66 | Ch. 11. Legal Remedies: "On the Basis of the Information" | 16:18:17 | 0:10:10 |
| 67 | Ch. 11. Losses: "Who Owns Residential Credit Risk?" | 16:28:27 | 0:13:22 |
| 68 | Commission Conclusions on Ch. 11 | 16:41:49 | 0:02:33 |
| 69 | Early 2007: Spreading Subprime Worries | 16:44:22 | 0:07:02 |
| 70 | Ch. 12. Goldman: Let's be Aggressive | 16:51:24 | 0:13:59 |
| 71 | Bear Stearns's Hedge Funds | 17:05:23 | 0:16:01 |
| 72 | Rating Agencies | 17:21:24 | 0:04:27 |
| 73 | AIG: Well Bigger | 17:25:51 | 0:07:39 |
| 74 | Commission Conclusions on Ch. 12 | 17:33:30 | 0:00:56 |
| 75 | Chapter 13 Summer 2007: Disruptions in Funding Intro | 17:34:26 | 0:02:06 |
| 76 | Ch 13 IKB of Germany "Real Money Investors" | 17:36:32 | 0:05:42 |
| 77 | Ch 13 Countrywide: "That's our 9/11" | 17:42:14 | 0:08:29 |
| 78 | Ch 13 BNP Paribas: "The ringing of the bells" | 17:50:43 | 0:04:40 |
| 79 | Ch 13 SIVs: "An Oasis of Calm" | 17:55:23 | 0:04:04 |
| 80 | Ch 13 Money funds and other investors: "Drink[ing] from a fire hose" | 17:59:27 | 0:06:19 |
| 81 | Commission conclusions on Chapter 13 | 18:05:46 | 0:01:39 |
| 82 | Chapter 14 Late 2007 to early 2008: Billions in subprime losses (Intro) | 18:07:25 | 0:02:42 |
| 83 | Ch 14 Merrill Lynch: "Dawining awareness over the course of the summer" | 18:10:07 | 0:11:50 |
| 84 | Ch 14 Citigroup: "That would not in any way have excited my attention" | 18:21:57 | 0:22:26 |
| 85 | Ch 14 AIG's dispute with Goldman: "There could never be losses" | 18:44:23 | 0:32:30 |
| 86 | Ch 14 Federal Reserve: "The discount window wasn't working" | 19:16:53 | 0:07:47 |
| 87 | Ch 14 Monoline Insurers: "We never expected losses" | 19:24:40 | 0:09:16 |
| 88 | Commission Conclusions on Chapter 14 | 19:33:56 | 0:01:15 |
| 89 | Chapter 15 March 2008: The fall of Bear Stearns (Intro) | 19:35:11 | 0:03:48 |
| 90 | Ch 15 "I requested some forbearance" | 19:38:59 | 0:04:06 |
| 91 | Ch 15 "We were suitably skeptical" | 19:43:05 | 0:03:56 |
| 92 | Ch 15 "Turn into a death spiral" | 19:47:01 | 0:09:15 |
| 93 | Ch 15 "Duty to protect their investors" | 19:56:16 | 0:11:06 |
| 94 | Ch 15 "The Government would not permit a higher number" | 20:07:22 | 0:04:42 |
| 95 | Ch 15 "It was heading to a black hole" | 20:12:04 | 0:02:49 |
| 96 | Commission Conclusions on Chapter 15 | 20:14:53 | 0:01:16 |
| 97 | Chapter 16 March to August 2008: Systemic Risk Concerns (Intro) | 20:16:09 | 0:02:38 |
| 98 | Ch 16 The Federal Reserve: "When people got scared" | 20:18:47 | 0:08:36 |
| 99 | Ch 16 JP Morgan: "Refusing to unwind...would be unforgiveable" | 20:27:23 | 0:05:16 |
| 100 | Ch 16 The Fed and the SEC: "Weak liquidity position" | 20:32:39 | 0:07:39 |