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Financial Crisis Inquiry Report chapters

About this audiobook · Recording details

Recording joanne-turner · Narrated by Joanne Turner, Cbteddy, mpinedag

Showing 100 of 183 chapters

Chapter titles and times
ChapterTitleStartDuration
1Preface0:00:000:08:03
2Conclusions of the Commission0:08:030:38:05
3Conclusions of the Commission, concluded0:46:080:22:59
4Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 11:09:070:38:26
5Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 21:47:330:45:54
6Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 32:33:270:17:57
7Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: Commercial Paper and Repos2:51:240:30:09
8Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: The Savings and Loan Crisis3:21:330:18:16
9Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac3:39:490:20:26
10Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Structured Finance4:00:150:12:11
11Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: The Growth of Derivatives4:12:260:25:53
12Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Expansion of Banking Activities4:38:190:19:24
13Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Long-Term Capital Management4:57:430:12:00
14Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Dot-Com Crash5:09:430:12:11
15Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: The Wages of Finance5:21:540:13:26
16Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Financial Sector Growth5:35:200:08:47
17Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Mortgage Securitization5:44:070:17:04
18Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Greater Access to Lending6:01:110:06:19
19Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Subprime Lenders in Turmoil6:07:300:05:33
20Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: The Regulators6:13:030:19:20
21Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Housing, A Powerful Stabilizing Force6:32:230:19:39
22Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Subprime Loans, Buyers Will Pay A Premium6:52:020:18:12
23Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Citigroup: Invited Regulatory Scrutiny7:10:140:04:42
24Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Federal Rules: Intended to Curb Unfair or Abusive Lending7:14:560:12:52
25Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. States: Long-Standing Position7:27:480:04:02
26Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Community-Lending Pledges: What We Do Is Reaffirm Our Intention"7:31:500:10:44
27Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Bank Capital Standards: "Arbitrage"7:42:340:05:45
28Ch. 6. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 67:48:190:01:18
29Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. An Irresistible Profit Opportunity7:49:370:10:21
30Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Mortgages: A Good Loan7:59:580:32:56
31Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Federal Regulators: Immunity from Many State Laws is a Significant Benefit8:32:540:06:49
32Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Wall Street Was Very Hungry For Our Product8:39:430:17:23
33Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Moody's: Given A Blank Check8:57:060:16:09
34Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Less Competition in the Marketplace9:13:150:13:09
35Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 79:26:240:03:24
36Ch. 8. The CDO Machine9:29:480:07:50
37Ch. 8. We Created the Investor9:37:380:22:21
38Ch. 8. Bear Stearns' Hedge Funds: It Functioned Fine Up Until One Day It Just Didn't Function9:59:590:10:33
39Ch. 8. Citigroup's Liquidity puts: A Potential Conflict of Interest10:10:320:10:51
40Ch. 8. AIG:Golden Goose for the Entire Street10:21:230:10:28
41Ch. 8. Goldman Sachs: Multiplied the Effects of the Collapse in Subprime10:31:510:17:16
42Ch. 8. Moody's: Achieved Through Some Alchemy10:49:070:18:33
43Ch. 8. SEC: It's Going to be an Awfully Big Mess11:07:400:19:27
44Commission Conclusions on Chapter 811:27:070:02:55
45Chapter 9. The Bubble, "A Credit-induced Boom"11:30:020:15:00
46Mortgage Fraud: Crime-facilitative environments11:45:020:22:31
47Disclosure and due diligence: A Quality Control Issue in the Factory12:07:330:24:27
48Regulators: markets will always self-correct12:32:000:14:56
49Leveraged Loans and Commercial Real Estate: You've Got to Get Up and Dance12:46:560:11:08
50Lehman: From Moving to Storage12:58:040:07:47
51Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Two Stark Choices13:05:510:11:36
522006: Increase Our Penetration into Subprime. 2007: Moving deeper into the credit pool13:17:270:12:30
53Affordable housing goals: "GSEs cried bloody murder forever." The impact of the goals13:29:570:17:05
54Commission Conclusions on Chapter 913:47:020:01:39
55Ch. 10. CDO Managers: "We Are Not A Rent-A-Manager"13:48:410:09:52
56Ch. 10. Credit Default Swaps: "Dumb Question"13:58:330:24:17
57Citigroup: "I Do Not Believe We Were Powerless"14:22:500:18:04
58AIG: "I'm Not Getting Paid Enough to Stand on These Tracks"14:40:540:08:42
59Merrill Lynch: "Whatever It Takes"14:49:360:12:28
60Regulators: "Are Undue Concentrations of Risk Developing?"15:02:040:07:29
61Moody's: "It Was All About Revenue"15:09:330:23:34
62Commission Conclusions on Chapter 1015:33:070:02:20
63Ch. 11. The Bust. Delinquencies: "The Turn of the Housing Market"15:35:270:29:56
64Ch. 11. Rating Downgrades: "Never Before"16:05:230:08:04
65Ch. 11. CDOs: "Climbing the Wall of Subprime Lending"16:13:270:04:50
66Ch. 11. Legal Remedies: "On the Basis of the Information"16:18:170:10:10
67Ch. 11. Losses: "Who Owns Residential Credit Risk?"16:28:270:13:22
68Commission Conclusions on Ch. 1116:41:490:02:33
69Early 2007: Spreading Subprime Worries16:44:220:07:02
70Ch. 12. Goldman: Let's be Aggressive16:51:240:13:59
71Bear Stearns's Hedge Funds17:05:230:16:01
72Rating Agencies17:21:240:04:27
73AIG: Well Bigger17:25:510:07:39
74Commission Conclusions on Ch. 1217:33:300:00:56
75Chapter 13 Summer 2007: Disruptions in Funding Intro17:34:260:02:06
76Ch 13 IKB of Germany "Real Money Investors"17:36:320:05:42
77Ch 13 Countrywide: "That's our 9/11"17:42:140:08:29
78Ch 13 BNP Paribas: "The ringing of the bells"17:50:430:04:40
79Ch 13 SIVs: "An Oasis of Calm"17:55:230:04:04
80Ch 13 Money funds and other investors: "Drink[ing] from a fire hose"17:59:270:06:19
81Commission conclusions on Chapter 1318:05:460:01:39
82Chapter 14 Late 2007 to early 2008: Billions in subprime losses (Intro)18:07:250:02:42
83Ch 14 Merrill Lynch: "Dawining awareness over the course of the summer"18:10:070:11:50
84Ch 14 Citigroup: "That would not in any way have excited my attention"18:21:570:22:26
85Ch 14 AIG's dispute with Goldman: "There could never be losses"18:44:230:32:30
86Ch 14 Federal Reserve: "The discount window wasn't working"19:16:530:07:47
87Ch 14 Monoline Insurers: "We never expected losses"19:24:400:09:16
88Commission Conclusions on Chapter 1419:33:560:01:15
89Chapter 15 March 2008: The fall of Bear Stearns (Intro)19:35:110:03:48
90Ch 15 "I requested some forbearance"19:38:590:04:06
91Ch 15 "We were suitably skeptical"19:43:050:03:56
92Ch 15 "Turn into a death spiral"19:47:010:09:15
93Ch 15 "Duty to protect their investors"19:56:160:11:06
94Ch 15 "The Government would not permit a higher number"20:07:220:04:42
95Ch 15 "It was heading to a black hole"20:12:040:02:49
96Commission Conclusions on Chapter 1520:14:530:01:16
97Chapter 16 March to August 2008: Systemic Risk Concerns (Intro)20:16:090:02:38
98Ch 16 The Federal Reserve: "When people got scared"20:18:470:08:36
99Ch 16 JP Morgan: "Refusing to unwind...would be unforgiveable"20:27:230:05:16
100Ch 16 The Fed and the SEC: "Weak liquidity position"20:32:390:07:39