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Freedom of the Will chapters

About this audiobook · Recording details

Recording philip-naudus · Narrated by Philip Naudus, Jim Locke

41 chapters

Chapter titles and times
ChapterTitleStartDuration
1Preface0:00:000:14:38
2I.I - Concerning the nature of the will0:14:380:11:45
3I.II - Concerning the determination of the Will0:26:230:26:40
4I.III - Concerning the meaning of the terms Necessity, Impossibility, Inability, etc.; and of Contingence0:53:030:21:10
5I.IV - Of the distinction of natural and moral necessity and inability1:14:130:19:50
6I.V - Concerning the notion of liberty, and of moral agency1:34:030:09:52
7II.I - Showing the manifest inconsistence of the Arminian notion of liberty of will, consisting in the will's self-determining power1:43:550:10:46
8II.II - Several supposed ways of evading the foregoing reasoning considered1:54:410:13:49
9II.III - Whether any event whatsoever, and volition in particular, can come to pass without a cause of its existence2:08:300:16:36
10II.IV - Whether volition can arise without a cause, through the activity of the nature of the soul2:25:060:11:30
11II.V - Showing, that if the things asserted in these evasions should be supposed to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and can't help the cause of Arminian liberty; and how (this being the state of the case) Arminian writers are obliged to talk inconsistently2:36:360:10:44
12II.VI - Concerning the will's determining in things which are perfectly indifferent, in the view of the mind2:47:200:19:43
13II.VII - Concerning the notion of liberty of will consisting in indifference3:07:030:25:23
14II.VIII - Concerning the supposed liberty of the will, as opposite to all necessity3:32:260:09:23
15II.IX - Of the connection of the acts of the will with the dictates of the understanding3:41:490:19:03
16II.X - Volition necessarily connected with the influence of motives; with particular observations on the great inconsistence of Mr. Chubb's assertions and reasonings, about the freedom of the will4:00:520:34:51
17II.XI - The evidence of God's certain foreknowledge of the volitions of moral agents4:35:430:51:00
18II.XII - God's certain foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents, inconsistent with such a contingence of those volitions, as is without all necessity5:26:430:37:10
19II.XIII - Whether we suppose the volitions of moral agents to be connected with anything antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as to overthrow Arminian liberty6:03:530:08:59
20III.I - God's moral excellency necessary, yet virtuous and praiseworthy6:12:520:09:37
21III.II - The acts of the will of the human soul of Jesus Christ necessarily holy, yet truly virtuous, praiseworthy, rewardable, etc.6:22:290:35:58
22III.III - The case of such as are given up of god to sin, and of fallen man in general, proves moral necessity and inability to be consistent with blameworthiness6:58:270:18:12
23III.IV - Command, and obligation to obedience, consistent with moral inability to obey7:16:390:28:52
24III.V - That sincerity of desires and endeavors, which is supposed to excuse in the nonperformance of things in themselves good, particularly considered7:45:310:23:16
25III.VI - Liberty of indifference, not only not necessary to virtue, but utterly inconsistent with it; and all, either virtuous or vicious habits or inclinations, inconsistent with Arminian notions of liberty and moral agency8:08:470:23:32
26III.VII - Arminian notions of moral agency inconsistent with all influence of motive and inducement, in either virtuous or vicious actions8:32:190:17:44
27IV.I - The essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart, and acts of the will, lies not in their cause, but their nature8:50:030:18:43
28IV.II - The falseness and inconsistence of that metaphysical notion of action, and agency, which seems to be generally entertained by the defenders of the arminian doctrine concerning liberty, moral agency, etc.9:08:460:23:17
29The reasons why some think it contrary to common Sense, to suppose those things which are necessary to be worthy of either Praise or Blame.9:32:030:15:29
30IV.IV - It is agreeable to common sense, and the natural notions of mankind, to suppose moral necessity to be consistent with praise and blame, reward and punishment9:47:320:23:00
31IV.V - Concerning those objections, that this scheme of necessity renders all means and endeavors for the avoiding of sin, or the obtaining virtue and holiness, vain, and to no purpose; and that it makes men no more than mere machines in affairs of morality and religion10:10:320:17:56
32IV.VI - Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been maintained, that it agrees with the stoical doctrine of fate, and the opinions of Mr. Hobbes10:28:280:08:14
33IV.VII - Concerning the necessity of the divine will10:36:420:20:48
34IV.VIII - Some further objections against the moral necessity of god's volitions considered10:57:300:30:29
35IV.IX - Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been maintained, that it makes god the author of sin11:27:590:34:49
36IV.X - Concerning sin's first entrance into the world12:02:480:05:41
37IV.XI - Of a supposed inconsistence of these principles, with God's moral character12:08:290:12:29
38IV.XII - Of a supposed tendency of these principles to atheism and licentiousness12:20:580:08:21
39IV.XIII - Concerning that objection against the reasoning, by which the Calvinistic doctrine is supported, that it is metaphysical and abstruse12:29:190:13:19
40Conclusion12:42:380:23:23
41Appendix13:06:010:26:39